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USIB-D-5.1/7

3 May 1967

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Review of USIB Procedures for Dealing with
Overhead Reconnaissance and its Exploitation

REFERENCES : a. USIB-D-69.3/1, 17 January 1967, limited
distribution through restricted channels
b. DCID No. 2/7 of 23 April 1965
c. DCID No. 6/1 of 23 April 1965, limited
distribution through special channels

1. Pursuant to authorization by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), the enclosed memorandum from Mr. John Bross, Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation (D/DCI/NIPE), in response to the instructions by Mr. Helms summarized in paragraph 2 of reference a., is circulated for consideration by the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) of the actions recommended in paragraph 5 thereof.

2. As indicated, the attached draft Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) proposed by Mr. Bross would establish a "Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX)" as a single "instrumentality" to serve USIB in developing intelligence guidance for both imagery collection by overhead reconnaissance of denied areas (presently assigned to the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR)), and for its exploitation (in accordance with the approved National Tasking Plan). The functions of COMOR relating to SIGINT overhead reconnaissance projects and activities over denied areas would be transferred to the SIGINT Committee. On the effective date of the establishment of COMIREX, DCID No. 2/7 would be cancelled and COMOR would accordingly be abolished.

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NRO review(s) completed.

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USIB Action Requested

3. Board members are requested to advise the USIB Secretariat by close of business 18 May of their concurrence in or other views on the proposed actions contained in paragraph 5 of the enclosed memorandum ^{25X1} from Mr. Bross.



Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Review of USIB Procedures for Dealing with
Overhead Reconnaissance and its Exploitation

1. This memorandum contains recommendations for USIB consideration in paragraph 5, in response to your memorandum to me on the "Need for a USIB Imagery Instrumentality" dated 12 January 1967.

2. You instructed me to take the lead in developing a plan, including terms of reference, for an "instrumentality" to serve the Board in monitoring and coordinating the implementation of the National Tasking Plan for imagery exploitation. You also asked that I consider ways and means to facilitate USIB's procedures and abilities to deal with all aspects of the imagery problem, including collection as well as exploitation.

3. In making this review, I have consulted with and been assisted by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the Director, DIA, as well as representatives of their agencies and other members of the intelligence community concerned with this problem.

4. As a result of this review, I believe that there is a general consensus on the following conclusions:

a. The close relationship of intelligence guidance for imagery collection by overhead reconnaissance and for its exploitation makes it desirable that a single "instrumentality" be established to serve the Board on both aspects of the imagery problem. A draft DCID to accomplish this purpose is attached hereto.

b. Similarly, the increasing need to relate intelligence guidance for SIGINT collection and exploitation by overhead reconnaissance to all other SIGINT activities has led me to conclude that the SIGINT Committee should be charged with serving the USIB with respect to all such activities. It is believed that this reassignment of SIGINT functions can be made without requiring amendment of DCID No. 6/1 on the SIGINT Committee.

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5. It is therefore recommended that you authorize the circulation of the following proposed actions for telephonic concurrence by the United States Intelligence Board:

a. Approve the attached draft DCID establishing a USIB "Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX)".

b. Transfer the functions of the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) relating to SIGINT overhead reconnaissance projects and activities over denied areas to the SIGINT Committee under DCID No. 6/1.

c. Establish the effective date of a. and b. above as thirty days after final approval of these actions, at which time DCID No. 2/7 relating to COMOR would be cancelled.

d. In the meantime, direct the Chairmen of the SIGINT Committee and of the new COMIREX to make the necessary arrangements for a smooth transition of the functions previously assigned to COMOR.

Attachment
Draft DCID

(Signed)
John A. Bross
JOHN A. BROSS
D/DCI/NIPE

Recommendations Approved:

/s/ Richard Helms
Director of Central Intelligence

2 May 1967
Date

28 April 1967

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Attachment
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DCID No. _____
(New Series)

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/
COMMITTEE ON IMAGERY REQUIREMENTS AND EXPLOITATION (COMIREX)

1. Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 8, and for the purpose of assisting the United States Intelligence Board in providing approved intelligence guidance for the collection and exploitation of imagery,^{2/} a Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX) is hereby established as a committee of the USIB.

Functions and Responsibilities

2. In accordance with policies approved by the USIB, the Committee shall advise, assist, and generally act for the USIB on matters involving the coordinated development of intelligence guidance for imagery collection by overhead reconnaissance of denied areas^{3/} and, as set forth in the

1/ This Directive supersedes DCID No. 2/7 of 23 April 1965.

2/ For the purposes of this Directive, the term "imagery" includes all products of overhead reconnaissance which provide a permanent record of the likeness of any natural or man-made features, objects, and activities reproduced on photographic material. This imagery can be acquired through the sensing of the visual or any other segment of the electromagnetic spectrum by sensors, 25X1
 Within the context of this Directive, imagery does not include records of communications, radar signals or telemetry data which do not reproduce the likeness of objects on photographic material.

3/ Denied areas include all territory and territorial waters claimed by Communist nations, as well as such other areas of priority intelligence interest as may be determined by USIB.

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"National Tasking Plan for the Exploitation of Multi-Sensor Imagery," on matters involving the exploitation of imagery. Any action or recommendation involving the establishment of policy shall be referred by COMIREX to the USIB. The responsibilities of COMIREX do not include intelligence guidance for the collection of imagery required in direct support of actively combatant forces.

3. The Committee shall:

a. Formulate recommendations for the establishment by USIB of intelligence guidance for imagery collection by overhead reconnaissance in consonance with the essential national needs for information. The Committee shall take appropriate action through USIB to ensure the validity and practicality of this guidance in the light of changing national circumstances and cost effectiveness considerations.

b. Monitor and keep the USIB appropriately advised concerning the responsiveness of existing and potential systems for the collection of imagery by overhead reconnaissance to USIB needs for intelligence information.

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c. As appropriate, maintain cognizance and keep the USIB advised of the plans and capabilities of all Government agencies for the collection of imagery by overhead reconnaissance.

d. Monitor and coordinate on behalf of the USIB all matters relating to the effective implementation, execution, evaluation, and revision of the National Tasking Plan for the Exploitation of Multi-Sensor Imagery, and, as appropriate, maintain cognizance of other plans and policies relating to imagery exploitation.

e. Formulate recommendations to USIB calculated to ensure the validity and realism of intelligence guidance for First and Second Phase Exploitation and Third Phase Basic Support Exploitation activities, and their conformity to the National Tasking Plan.*

* First-Phase Exploitation is the preliminary, rapid interpretation of newly acquired imagery for the purpose of extracting, organizing, and communicating information to satisfy immediate priority needs.

Second-Phase Exploitation is the systematic review of newly acquired reconnaissance imagery for the purpose of providing a succinct, organized, and comprehensive summary of the information extracted, or available for extraction from the imagery obtained by a mission.

Third-Phase Exploitation is the exploitation in depth of reconnaissance imagery for the purpose of extracting and coherently organizing the accurate, detailed, and comprehensive information required in the production of intelligence.

Basic Intelligence Support Exploitation is that part of Third Phase Exploitation which is undertaken to provide a flow of basic image-derived information required by more than one agency, department, or command.

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
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f. Monitor and coordinate by the establishment of appropriate guidance, the development and maintenance of the National Data Base of Image-Derived Information in accordance with the National Tasking Plan.

g. Monitor the responsiveness of exploitation to established intelligence needs, and, concurrently, review: (1) the products of the exploitation effort in terms of their utility to consumers and the relative cost; (2) the need to change either collection or exploitation guidance accordingly.

h. Determine the specific need for overseas processing of strategic overhead reconnaissance imagery and provide intelligence guidance for the First Phase Exploitation thereof to meet national needs. The Committee shall work in concert with reconnaissance management authorities to review and, subject to approval of the USIB,



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i. Advise the USIB with respect to the appropriate balance between current and planned programs for the collection and exploitation of imagery.

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j. Examine and make recommendations with respect to the impact of projected overhead imagery collection systems on imagery exploitation requirements and techniques.

k. Foster the effective interface of imagery interpretation equipment research and development at the national and departmental levels with projected exploitation activities, and provide a focal point for the expeditious exchange of information in the interests of ensuring coordinated equipment procurement programs.

l. Examine and make recommendations, as appropriate, on such related matters as dissemination and special security controls.

Organization and Procedures

4. The Committee shall be composed of designated representatives of the departments and agencies represented on the USIB, including Army, Navy, and Air Force representatives. Representatives of authorities engaged in imagery reconnaissance or exploitation under the purview of this Directive shall provide consultants to support the Committee as required. The Chairman may, as appropriate, invite representatives of other agencies to participate in the work of the Committee.

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5. The Chairman of the Committee shall be designated by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with the USIB.

6. To accomplish its responsibilities, the COMIREX will be supported by subcommittees as approved by the USIB. The Chairman of the Committee may constitute working groups as required. The Committee will be supported by a staff which will be directly responsible to the Chairman, COMIREX, and manned by personnel provided by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

7. The COMIREX shall share with other USIB committees responsibility for the coordination of areas of joint or overlapping concern.

RICHARD HELMS
Director of Central Intelligence

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